Abstract: Vinod 1997 Vinod , 1998 discuss the Godambe-Durbin theory of estimating functions EFs and its potential in econometrics. Here we consider a popular application of EFs called generalized estimating equations GEE. It is typically applied to panel data, where the heteroscedasticity is analytically related to , the regression parameter, and where the dependent v ariable is binary. Geddes 1997 studies panel data on regulated electric utilities with exclusive geographic franchises, and the turnover of the chief executive o cer CEO on the job. Our GEE estimates reverse his somewhat counterintuitive result that rm performance variables do not a ect the turnover of the CEO. We test the empirical validity of predictions of i regulatory slack, ii rent seeking, and iii political pressure hypotheses, and reject the rst.
GEE, which is popular in biostatistics Dunlop, 1994 , Diggle et al, 1994 , Liang and Zeger, 1995 We provide an explanation of why GEE is popular by showing that it is simpler and theoretically superior to its competition: least squares LS and maximum likelihood ML. Since econometricians rarely use anything other than LS or ML, this explanation is novel. Although the underlying results are known in the EF literature Kale, 1991, and Heyde, 1997 , their application to the panel data case clari es and highlights the advantages of EFs.
We consider a typical logit-type speci cation and apply GEE to panel data with limited binary dependent v ariables. This application of EF theory will explain why EFs yield simpler and superior estimators here.
Consider T real variables y i i = 1 ; 2; ; T : y i IND i ; 2 i ; where is p 1 1 where IND suggests an independently not necessarily identically distributed random variable r.v. with mean i , variance 2 i and 2 does not depend on . Let y = y i be a T 1 v ector and V = V a r y = 2 V a r denote the T T covariance matrix. The IND assumption implies that V is a diagonal matrix depending only on the i-th component i of the T 1 vector .
The common parameter vector of interest is that measures how depends on covariates x. The heteroscedastic variances i are somewhat unusual. We emphasize that i and i in 1 are functionally related to each other through , implying a special" kind of heteroscedasticity. I f y i are discrete stochastic processes, time series data then i and i are conditional on past data. The usual log-likelihood is: LnL = ,T= 2ln2 , T= 2ln 2 , S 1 , S 2 2 where S 1 = 1 =2 T i=1 ln i , and S 2 = T i=1 y i , i 2 = 2 2 i . The rst order condition FOC for generalized LS or GLS is @S 2 =@ = 0 . The FOC for maximizing the LnL ML estimator is @S 1 + S 2 =@ = @S 2 =@ i @ i =@ + @S 1 + S 2 =@ i @ i =@ = 0 , using @S 1 =@ i = 0 . Thus @LnL=@ = T i=1 y i , i @ i =@ = 2 i , T i=1 @ i =@ =2 i + T i=1 y i , i 2 @ i =@ =2 2 2 i . In our context, the quasi score function QSF equals the rst term @S 2 =@ i @ i =@ . Its expectation, EQSF = T i=1 y i , i @ i =@ = 2 i = 0 ; since i 0 and Ey i = i are assumed. Thus the QSF de ned this way alone yields an unbiased EF.
Since @ i =@ 6 = 0 is assumed, the inclusion of the remaining two terms of the FOC for ML would obviously lead to a biased EF.
Wedderburn 1974 was motivated by applications to the generalized linear model GLM, where one is unwilling to specify any more than mean and variance properties. His quasi-likelihood function QLF is a hypothetical integral of the QSF. The true integral i.e., the likelihood function can fail to exist when the integrability condition" of symmetric partials is violated, McCullagh and Nelder 1989, p. 333 . The EFs are de ned as functions of data and parameters, gy; . Unbiased EFs satisfy Eg = 0 . Godambe's 1960 optimal EFs minimize V a r g =E@g=@ 2 .
Godambe 1985 proved that the optimal EF is the quasi-score function QSF. The optimal EFs QSFs are computed from the means and variances, without assuming further knowledge of higher moments skewness, kurtosis or the form of the density. The methods based on QLFs are generally regarded as more robust." For example , Liang et al 1992, p.11 show that the traditional likelihood requires additional restrictions.
In matrix notation write 1 as: y = + , E = 0 , E 0 = 2 V = 2 diag i . If D = f@ i =@ j g is a T p matrix, McCullagh and Nelder 1989, p.327 show that the QSF; is:
QSF; = D 0 V ,1 y , = 2 = T i=1 y i , i @ i =@ = 2 i : 3
The optimal EF estimator of is obtained by solving the nonlinear equation QSF = 0 for . The following three key properties of the QSFs lead to optimality of EF estimators:
i Since Ey , = 0 ; E QSF = 0 ; implying that QSF is an unbiased EF.
iiCovQSF = D 0 ,1 D= 2 = I F , the Fisher information matrix.
iii Since ,E@QSF=@ = CovQSF = I F , its variance reaches the Cramer-Rao lower bound.
These statements do not require V to be diagonal as in 3, only that V be symmetric positive de nite having known functions of . Vinod 1997 gives examples where the EF estimator coincides with the least squares LS and maximum likelihood ML estimators. Our panel data logit example here is more interesting, because the EF estimator is distinct from both LS and ML estimators. While the LS and ML solve F OCs similar to 4 below, the EF estimator solves QSF = 0 : The chain rule on the FOC requires a second term involving @ i =@ , which is nonzero from 1 due to the special heteroscedasticity. A lesson of the EF-theory is that biased estimators can be acceptable but biased and ine cient EFs should be avoided. This is why the EF estimator obtained by solving QSF = 0 cannot be worse than the full-blown ML estimator. Although counter-intuitive, the simpler QSF = 0 is actually superior to ML whenever the heteroscedastic variance i depends on , in light of 4 above. The following section provides further details regarding the GEE model for panel data logits and probits.
GLM, GEE & PANEL LOGIT PROBIT LDV MODELS
This section provides an introduction to general linear model GLM and to the EF literature leading to GEE models. It may be skipped by statisticians familiar with the GLM and the GEE. We include it because even recent econometric literature dealing with logit, probit and limited dependent v ariable LDV models continues to ignore GLM and GEE models. For example, Baltagi 1995 , Hajivassiliou and Ruud 1994 their references do not even mention GLM or GEE.
The econometric context of this paper is a limited dependent v ariable model for panel data time series of cross sections typically estimated by the logit or probit. These LDV models are well known in biostatistics since the 1930s. GEE models generalize the LDV models by incorporating time dependence among repeated measurements for an individual subject. When the biometric panel is of laboratory animals having a common heritage, the time dependence is sometimes called the litter e ect." The GEE models incorporate di erent kinds of litter e ects characterized by serial correlation matrices R de ned later as functions of a parameter vector . This section ends with a statement of the formulas for the GEE estimator and its variance. We h a ve included a limited discussion of the economic issues regarding our application to CEO turnover, although the details are postponed till the next section.
In light of Result 1 above, to show that a quasi-ML or GEE estimator for panel data logit models is superior to the ML and LS, we h a ve t o establish that it has a special kind of heteroscedasticity. This is done in Result 2 of this section. In preparation for that result and for a better understanding of GEE, we include some discussion of the generalized linear model GLM literature, McCullagh and Nelder 1989 . This literature shows that the logit is not merely convenient, but implies a canonical link" for which a su cient" statistic exists. Since EF theory and GLM modeling terminology is not well known in econometrics, we begin by placing this i Instead of y N; 2 we allow non-normal distributions with various relations between mean and variance functions. Non-normality permits the expectation Ey = to take o n v alues only in a meaningful restricted range e.g., nonnegative i n teger counts or binary outcomes.
ii De ne the systematic component = X = p j=1 x j j ; where 2 ,1; 1; is a linear predictor.
iii A monotonic di erentiable link function = h relates Ey t o the systematic component X . The t-th observation satis es t = h t : For GLS, the link function is identity, o r = , since y 2 ,1; 1. When y data are counts of something, we need a link function which makes sure that X = 0: Similarly, for y as binary dummy v ariable outcomes, y 2 0; 1 , we need a link function h which maps the interval 0; 1 for y on ,1; 1 for X :In the CEO example below, we use a binary dummy dependent v ariable.
Remark 2: To obtain generality, the normal distribution is often replaced by a member of the exponential family of distributions, which includes Poisson, binomial, gamma, inverse-Gaussian, etc. It is well known that su cient statistics" are available for the exponential family. In our context, X 0 y which i s a p 1 v ector similar to , is a su cient statistic. A canonical" link function is one for which a su cient statistic of p 1 dimension exists. Some well known canonical link functions for distributions in the exponential family are: h = for Normal, h = log for Poisson, h = log =1 , for Binomial, and h = ,1= is negative for gamma distributions.
Remark 3: Since h = ,1=, based on the gamma distribution, is rarely used in econometrics, it is useful to remark on the special features of this link function. The gamma density is: fx = 1 =, e ,x x ,1 ; where; x 0; 0; 0: 6 Its mean is =, v ariance is = 2 , and the coe cient o f v ariation de ned as the standard deviation mean is ,0:5 , which is a constant, since is a constant parameter. Thus in applications where the variance increases with the mean, keeping the coe cient o f v ariation constant, the gamma distribution with a xed is attractive. Since the support of the gamma density i s 0 ; 1, rather than the ,1; 1, this is restrictive. However, for many economic variables, including our CEO example in the following section, this may be a desirable restriction. A competitor of the gamma model is the Log-Normal. Firth 1988 supports the gamma over the LogNormal under mutually reciprocal misspeci cations. Now w e state and prove the known result that when y is binary, heteroscedasticity measured by V a r t , the variance of t , depends on the regression coe cients . This dependence result also holds true for the more general case, where y is a categorical variable e.g., poor, good and excellent as three categories and to panel data where we h a ve a time series of cross sections. The general cases tend to be tedious and are discussed in the EF literature.
Result 2: The heteroscedastic V a r t is a function of the regression coe cients for a special case where y t is a binary dummy variable from time series or cross sectional data up to a possibly unknown scale parameter.
Proof: Let P t denote the probability that y t = 1. Our interest is in relating this probability t o v arious regressors at time t, or X t . If the binary dependent v ariable y t in 5 can assume only two v alues 1 or 0, then regression errors t also can and must assume only two v alues: 1 , X t or ,X t . The corresponding probabilities are: P t and 1 , P t respectively, which can be viewed as realizations of a binomial process. Note that E t = P t 1 , X t + 1 , P t ,X t = P t , X t :
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Hence the assumption that E t = 0 itself implies that P t = X t . T h us we h a ve the result that P t is a function of the regression parameters . Since E t = 0, the V a r t is simply the square of the two v alues of t weighted by the corresponding probabilities. After some algebra, thanks to certain cancellations, we h a ve V a r t = P t 1 , P t = X t 1 , X t . This proves the key result that both the mean and variance depend on , where EFs have superior properties.
We can extend the above result to other situations with limited dependent v ariables. In econometrics, the canonical link function terminology of Remark 2 is rarely used. Econometricians typically replace y t by unobservable latent variables and write the regression model as:
where the observable y t = 1 i f y t 0; and y t = 0 i f y t 0:
8 Now write P t = P r y t = 1 = P r y t 0 = P r X t + t 0, which implies that: P t = P r t ,X t = 1 , P r t X t = 1 ,
where we h a ve used the fact that t is a symmetric random variable de ned over an in nite range with density f t . In terms of cumulative distribution functions CDF we can write the last integral in 9 as FX t 2 0; 1 . Hence P t 2 0; 1 is guaranteed. It is obvious that if we c hoose a density which has an analytic CDF, the P t expressions will be convenient. For example, FX t = 1+exp,X t ,1 is the analytic CDF of the standard logistic distribution. From this, econometric texts derive the logit link function hP t = log P t =1,P t somewhat arduously. Since P t =1,P t is the ratio of the odds of y t = 1 to the odds of y t = 0, the practical implication of the logit link function is to regress the log odds ratio on X t . Clearly, a s P t in 0; 1 , the logit is de ned by hP 2 ,1; 1. The probit model is similar and also popular in econometrics. It was rst used for bioassay i n 1935 and uses the inverse of the CDF of the unit normal distribution as the link function: hP t = ,1 P t :
Remark 4: The normality assumption is obviously unrealistic when the variable assumes only a few values, or when the researcher is unwilling to assume precise knowledge about skewness, kurtosis, etc. Recall that QSF of 3 is the optimum EF and satis es three key properties. Econometricians generally use a feasible GLS" estimator, where the heteroscedasticity problem is solved by simply replacing V a r t b y its sample estimates. In the present context of binary data, V a r t is a function of and minimizing the S 2 with respect to wrt would have to allow for the dependence of V a r t o n . See 4 and Result 1 above. In the 1970's some biostatisticians simply ignored such dependence on for computational convenience. The EF-theory proves the surprising result that it would be suboptimal to incorporate the dependence of V a r t o n by including the extra term in the FOCs of 4. An initial appeal of EF-theory in biostatistics was that it provided a formal justi cation for the quasi-ML estimator used since the 1970's. We shall see that GEE goes beyond quasi-ML by o ering more exible correlation structures for panel data. As in McCullagh and Nelder 1989, we denote the log of the quasilikelihood by Q; y for based on the data y. F or the Normal distribution Q; y = ,0:5y, 2 , the variance function V a r = 1 and the canonical link is h = . F or the binomial, Q; y = ylog =1 , + log1 , ; V a r = 1 , ; h = log =1 , . For the gamma, Q; y = ,y= , log;Var = 2 and h = ,1=. Since the link function of the gamma has a negative sign, the signs of all regression coe cients are reversed if the gamma distribution is used. The quasi-score functions QSFs become our EFs as in 3:
10 where = h ,1 X and D = f@ t =@ j g is a T p matrix of partials and i s T T diagonal matrix with entries V a r t as noted above. The GLM estimate of is given by solving 10 for . T h us the complication arising from a binary or limited range dependent v ariable is solved by using the GLM method.
GLM for Panel Data:
The panel data involve an additional complication from three possible subscripts i, j and t. There are i = 1 ; ; N individuals about which cross sectional data are available in addition to the time series over t = 1 ; ; T on the dependent v ariable y it and p regressors x ijt , with j = 1 ; p. W e avoid subscript j by de ning x it as a p1 v ector. Geddes 1997 estimates a logit model for panel data from electric utilities focusing on the tenure of the chief executive o cer CEO relating it to age, salary, job performance, price charged for electricity, etc. His logit model estimates suggest the somewhat counterintuitive result that CEO job performance variables do not have a statistically signi cant e ect on the survival of the CEO. This paper reviews that result from the GEE perspective.
Let y it represent a binary choice variable such that y it = 1 ; if the CEO is removed and y it = 0, otherwise. Let P i;t denote the probability of turnover of i-th CEO i = 1 ; ; N at time t t = 1 ; ; T and note that:
Ey it = 1 P i;t + 01 , P i;t = P i;t :
11 Now, we remove the time subscript by collecting elements of P i;t and y it into T 1 v ectors and write Ey i = P i , a s a v ector of turnover probabilities for the i-th individual CEO. Let X i be a T p matrix of data on regressors for i-th individual. As before, let be ap1 v ector of regression parameters. If the method of latent v ariables is used, the decision to remove a CEO is 13 Now the logit link has hP i = log P i =1 , P i , probit link has hP i = ,1 P i and the gamma density of 6 implies reciprocal link h = ,1=.
Random E ects Model from Econometrics:
Instead of N separate i parameters for each CEO as in 13, econometricians often pool the data for all CEOs and split the errors as it =M i + it , where it represents random e ects" and M i denotes the individual effects." Using the logit link, the log-odds ratio in a so-called random e ects model is written as: logP i;t =1 , P i;t = x 0 it + M i + it ;
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The random e ects model also assumes that M i IID0; 2 M and it IID0; 2 are independent of each other and also independent of the regressors x it . It is explained in the panel data literature, Baltagi 1995, p.178 , that these individual e ects complicate matters signi cantly. Note that under the random e ects assumptions in 13, covariance over time is nonzero, E it is = 2 M . Hence independence is lost and the joint likelihood probability cannot be rewritten as a product of marginal likelihoods probabilities. Since the only feasible maximum likelihood implementation involves numerical integration, we m a y consider a less realistic xed e ects" model where the likelihood function is a product of marginals. Unfortunately, the xed e ects model still faces the so-called problem of incidental parameters" the number of parameters M i increases inde nitely as N ! 1 . Some other solutions from the econometrics literature referenced by Baltagi include Chamberlain's 1980 suggestion to maximize a conditional likelihood function. These ML or LS methods continue to su er from unnecessary complications arising from the extra term See eq. 4, which would make their FOCs See eq. 3 biased and ine cient.
1.2.3 Derivation of GEE, the Estimator for and Standard Errors:
Next, we describe how panel data GEE methods can avoid the di cult and ine cient LS or ML solutions in the econometrics literature. We shall write a quasi score function justi ed by the EF-theory as our GEE. We achieve a fully exible choice of error covariance structures by using link functions of the GLM. Since GEE is based on the QSF See eq.3, only the mean and variance are assumed to be known. The distribution itself can be any member of the exponential family with almost arbitrary skewness and kurtosis -not just the normal distribution assumed in the literature. i`Independence' means R is the identity matrix.
ii`Exchangeable' R means that all intertemporal correlations dened by corry it ; y is = , are constant.
iii`AR1' or rst order autoregressive model implies that R o r corry it ; y is simply equals jt,sj :
iv`Unstructured' correlations in R means that corry it ; y is = ts with TT , 1=2 distinct values for all pairwise correlations.
Finally, solving 16 for gives the GEE estimator, which is usually iteratively estimated. Liang and Zeger 1986 suggest a modi ed Fisher scoring" algorithm for these iterations. The initial choice of R is usually the identity matrix and standard GLM is rst estimated. The GEE algorithm then estimates R from the residuals of the GLM and iterates until convergence. We use Smith 1996 software in S-PLUS language on an IBM compatible computer. The theoretical justi cation for iterations exploits the property that a QML estimate is consistent e v en if R is misspeci ed, Liang, 1986, McCullagh and Nelder, 1989, p.333 In the following section we use the gamma family to x the relation between the mean and variance, instead of the traditional binomial or Poisson family. This is mainly because the gamma family gives better ts as measured by the lowest residual sum of squares RSS than other families of distributions. Remark 3 above notes other reasons why the gamma family and its canonical link may be appropriate. McCullagh and Nelder 1989, p. 290 suggest a deviance function as the di erence between two log likelihoods instead of RSS. We do not use deviances, since they need arti cial truncation to avoid computing log of a near zero number for the gamma family. A proof of consistency of the GEE estimator is given by B . L i 1997. Heyde 1997, p.89 gives the necessary and su cient conditions under which GEE are fully e cient asymptotically. Lipsitz et al 1994 report simulations showing that GEE are more e cient than ordinary logistic regressions. In conclusion, this section has shown that the GEE estimator is practical with attractive properties for the type of data studied here.
GEE ESTIMATION OF CEO TURNOVER AND THREE HYPOTHESES
In this section, we discuss the motivation for examining managerial turnover using GEE. An important w ay to align the interests of managers with those of owners is by linking managerial turnover to rm performance. Removal of a manager by a board of directors for performance reasons is a negative signal to the managerial labor market. If boards remove managers when a rm performs poorly, a n i n verse relationship between managerial turnover and performance will result. Using a variety of data sets, performance measures and empirical techniques, researchers have con rmed this relationship in many industries. Salancik and Pfe er 1980 report that when outsiders own stock there is a positive and signi cant correlation between pro t margin and managerial tenure. Warner, Watts, and Wruck 1988 and Coughlan and Schmidt 1985 nd that the probability of managerial turnover is inversely related to abnormal stock price performance. Weisbach 1988 nds that, given the behavior of stock returns, the probability of managerial turnover is negatively related to accounting performance. Barro and Barro 1990 report a negative relationship between turnover and performance for bank CEOs. The evidence is thus strongly supportive of the hypothesis that performance and managerial turnover are negatively related, consistent with an incentive-alignment view of CEO turnover. There are a number of reasons to believe that the performance-turnover relationship described above m a y be a ected by utility regulation. Investor-owned utilities are typically regulated by state public utility commissions, which administer rate-of-return regulation under exclusive geographic franchises. Two fundamental managerial functions, investment and nancing, are determined through the regulatory process. Hence regulation is crucial for managerial decisions.
Regulation supplants decisions normally made by rm owners and their managers with the administrative process. The signi cance of this control has been the subject of considerable debate. Some researchers suggest that rate-of-return regulation allows managers to incur high agency costs" with little fear of removal by o wners. After all, the return to managerial eciency, given that the maximum rate-of-return is achieved, is zero. In their classic article, Alchian and Kessel 1962 state: If regulated monopolists are able to earn more than the permissible pecuniary rate of return, then ine ciency" is a free good, because the alternative to ine ciency is the same pecuniary income and no ine ciency." This is essentially a regulatory slack" view of regulation, which takes regulation as exogenous: if the rm is earning at least the allowed rate-of-return then managers need not be concerned with operating in owners' interests, and managerial inefciency has zero opportunity cost in the alternative use of maximizing rm value. Regulation leads to a situation where monitoring by o wners has a low return, and owners engage in little of it.
Others suggest that regulatory rent-seeking" behavior will lead to managerial monitoring by o wners. For example, Crain and Zardkoohi 1978, 1980 rely on a rent-seeking hypothesis to arrive at the conclusion that managerial control mechanisms operate in regulated rms. They submit that there are potential monopoly rents available through regulation, which can be obtained via rent-seeking activity b y managers, and that private owners monitor on this basis. Firm resources, rather than being devoted to pro t-enhancing activities such as product development and marketing, are directed at in uencing the allowed rate-of-return and other regulated variables that a ect economic pro ts, making regulatory outcomes endogenous to managerial behavior. Such rent-seeking activities include political contributions and public relations programs, as well as payments to lawyers and consultants. Here managerial ine ciency carries a non-zero opportunity cost, providing an incentive for owners to monitor managers.
In a third view, commentators suggest that the regulatory process exposes managerial behavior to political forces. In Stigler's 1971 immortal words, the regulatory process automatically admits powerful outsiders to industry's councils," or as Joskow, Rose and Shepard 1993 state, Economic regulation imposes political outcomes in place of some private decisions or market outcomes." This view implies that the regulatory process provides organized pressure groups with a mechanism for translating their interests into outcomes. One important party likely to obtain greater control over the regulatory process is the consumer. In many regulatory processes, consumers are granted avenues by which they can organize and are given a special say in proceedings. The political power of consumers relative to shareholders is expected to increase under a political pressure" hypothesis. The variable that best measures consumer wealth is the real price of electricity, and we expect consumers to monitor managers on that basis. As applied to turnover, this implies that the political forum in which regulated CEOs operate results in turnover that responds positively to increases in electricity prices.
Our data set, described below, allows us to compare the predictions of i regulatory-slack, ii rent-seeking, and iii political pressure hypotheses in the case of US electric utilities. In testing these alternative h ypotheses, we are able to show h o w the GEE approach represents an improvement over standard limited dependent v ariable techniques. Below, we describe our data sources, variables, and present summary statistics. We show h o w our data allow tests of these hypotheses. We then present estimates of managerial turnover using GEE.
Description of Data
A sample of 95 investor-owned electric utilities IOUs was taken from those listed in the Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States, for which nancial and managerial data were available. The test years run from 1966 through 1988. We used numerous data sources to compile a large data set on managerial turnover and variables potentially a ecting turnover; see Geddes 1997 for details. The variables in the data set are brie y described below. Due to our need for data on CEO age, salary, and performance measures, the ultimate number of observations in the data set was 790 in variable groups discussed below.
Turnover measure:
The focus of this study is on the probability o f a c hange in the senior manager of an electric utility. Senior managers are de ned as the president or CEO of an IOU. If a change in the president or CEO was observed but actually the individual moved into the chairman's position this was not counted as a turnover. Our measure of managerial turnover, TURN=1 if the CEO left the rm, and zero otherwise. Data on reasons for departure ring, quits or illness are unavailable.
Managerial characteristics:
We control for three important managerial characteristics. AGE, the age of the senior manager, is expected to a ect turnover positively since managers are more likely to change as they approach retirement age. This e ect is more explicitly studied by a dummy v ariable: RETIRE=1, if the manager is aged 63 through 66. A non-trivial number of managerial changes occur around normal retirement age, and are likely to be unrelated to performance. TENURE is the number of years served as the CEO, and is also expected to positively a ect turnover. SALARY is the annual real compensation including bonus of the CEO and we expect that it will be negatively related to turnover, if higher paid CEOs are less likely to leave.
Firm characteristics:
We include SIZE as measured by the annual real sales of the rm in dollars. It is often alleged that larger rms have a higher rate of CEO turnover Warner, Watts, and Wruck 1988. We also examine the responsiveness of CEO turnover at regulated rms to shareholder wealth, as measured by accounting returns. Despite the problems with using earnings data to measure economic pro ts Fisher and McGowan 1983 , accounting returns do measure short-term pro ts, rather than the discounted present v alue of the expected future cash ows of the rm, as measured by the stock price.
Since stock prices are forward-looking, they incorporate the possibility that the board will remove the CEO after poor performance Weisbach 1988. The use of stock prices may therefore understate the e ects of managerial monitoring. Also, Joskow, Rose and Shepard 1996 note that accounting returns are likely to be relatively more important in electric utilities, which are regulated. Changes in accounting returns are thus the best available measure of changes in owner wealth when examining managerial turnover in electricals. The two measures used here are ROA and ROE. ROA is the rm's realized return-on-assets = gross income total assets. ROE is the realized return on equity = gross income total stockholder's equity.
Regional variables:
These dummy v ariables control for the area or region of the country in which the rm operates. They are a proxy for such diverse factors as di erent fed-eral air pollution standards, availability o f c heap hydroelectric power, age of the capital stock, di erent population densities, weather, etc. To create these variables, the country was divided into seven regions. Northeast NEDUM, Mid-Atlantic MADUM, Southeast SEDUM, South-central SCDUM, Northwest NWDUM, Midwest MWDUM, and the Southwest SWDUM. The su x DUM is for dummy v ariable, i.e., they equal unity if the electric utility operated in that region and zero otherwise. The omitted category was the Southwest. Table 1 summarizes the predictions of the three hypotheses and the variables used to test them. Table 2 reports the GEE estimation results using the gamma density and assuming that the correlation structure over time is unrestricted compare to Table 2 of Geddes, 1997 . Since the likely sign of the coe cient is known from the theories discussed above, we use one-sided tests.
Shareholder and Consumer Wealth Variables for Hypothesis Testing Shareholder wealth:
Sharholder wealth comes from accounting returns. Since it is unlikely that managers would respond to the level of shareholder wealth, the year-to-year changes in ROA and ROE were used to construct two new variables, ROA and ROE. These variables measure the change in shareholder wealth prior to a particular observed rm-year. The regulatory slack h ypothesis predicts that managerial turnover will be unrelated to changes in returns, while the rent-seeking hypothesis predicts that turnover will be negatively related to changes in returns. An alternative test of the rent-seeking hypothesis involves allowed" returns. Since regulatory rent-seeking activity includes attempts by managers to in uence the return allowed by the regulatory commission it may result in a greater deviation of the realized rate-ofreturn from that allowed by the commission. That is, managers may devote resources to maximizing the deviation between the realized and allowed return, and may be monitored by o wners on that basis.
The rent-seeking hypothesis is further tested by relating managerial turnover in IOUs to di erences between the actual and allowed returns, and to changes in allowed returns. Two new variables were created, DEVROA and DEVROE, which are the year-to-year deviations between the return allowed by the regulatory commission and the realized return for ROA and ROE respectively. The rent-seeking hypothesis predicts that the probability of turnover will decrease as DEVROA and DEVROE increase.
Customer wealth:
To test the political pressure hypothesis, a measure of the change in customer wealth was developed. A v ariable called PRICE was created, which is the year-to-year change in the real price of electricity sold by the rm. If consumers exercise power via the political process, then managerial turnover will be positively related to changes in price. That is, managers will be removed when the real price of electricity rises, and conversely. Table 2 presents GEE estimates of the e ects of rm performance on managerial turnover. It is important to note that the gamma function reverses the signs of the coe cients relative to the logit. In Table 2 , most variables have the expected e ect on turnover. For example, RETIRE, TENURE and lnSIZE signi cantly increase the probability of managerial change.
With retirement e ects controlled for by RETIRE, it does not appear that AGE a ects CEO turnover. SALARY signi cantly decreases turnover, as predicted. Most regional variables have little e ect, with the exception of the Southeast dummy, which decreases the turnover probability. Importantly, both ROA and ROE decrease the probability of managerial turnover, with ROE signi cant at the 2 percent level. This is strongly at odds with logit estimates reported in Table 2 of Geddes 1997, p.275 . These GEE estimates provide support for the rent-seeking hypothesis over the regulatory slack h ypothesis, as discussed above.
Turnover and Allowed Returns:
The rent-seeking hypothesis can also be tested by examining the e ect managers have on di erences between allowed and realized rates of return. That is, managers may be monitored by o wners on the basis of their ability t o achieve a return higher than that allowed by the regulatory commission.
Here, the rent-seeking hypothesis predicts that the probability of turnover will be negatively related to the deviation between actual and allowed returns, DEVROA and DEVROE. GEE parameter estimates including DEVROA and DEVROE are reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 . The reduced number of observations available here is due to lack of data on allowed returns for certain rm-years. Here, DEVROA is signi cant at approximately the 6 percent level, with greater deviations of the realized return from the allowed decreasing the probability of managerial turnover. These tests do not provide support for a regulatory slack h ypothesis, but are consistent with a rent-seeking hypothesis. They suggest that owners do monitor managers on the basis of deviations from allowed returns.
Managerial Turnover and Electricity Price Changes: GEE estimates incorporating PRICE are reported in column 1 of Table  3 . These estimates support an important conclusion: managerial turnover in IOUs is sensitive to increases in price. This is consistent with estimates reported in Geddes 1997, but levels of signi cance are higher here. It appears that managers in electric utilities are also monitored on the basis of price changes, consistent with a political pressure" hypothesis. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper reviews recent developments in the estimating function literature and explains why estimation problems involving limited dependent variables are particularly promising for applications of the EF theory. Our Result 1 shows that whenever heteroscedasticity is related to the traditional LS or ML estimators have an unnecessary extra term leading to biased and ine cient EFs. We note that recent econometric literature, surveyed in Hajivassiliou and Ruud 1994 or Baltagi 1995 while ignoring the simpler GEE methods, is suggesting computer intensive nonparametric and simulation based method of moments estimators. These estimators are obviously suboptimal, since they fail to remove the extra term mentioned above. Our Result 2 shows why binary dependent v ariables have such heteroscedasticity.
The panel data GEE estimator in 16 is implemented by Liang and Zeger's 1986 modi ed Fisher scoring" algorithm with variances given in 17. The exibility of the GEE estimator arises from its ability to specify the matrix of autocorrelations R as a function of a set of parameters . W e use unstructured R with minimum prior assumptions to achieve robustness and use a canonical link" function satisfying su ciency" properties available for all distributions from the exponential family. I t i s w ell known that this family includes many of the familiar distributions including Normal, binomial, Poisson, exponential, gamma, etc. Our Remark 3 explains the advantages of the gamma family with its canonical link used here, which is almost never used in econometrics.
The regression results reported here are consistent with the rent-seeking" hypothesis regarding the intensity of managerial monitoring of rm managers by o wners in the electric utility industry. The GEE estimates imply rejection of the monopoly slack" view. This reverses the conclusions suggested by logit tests in Geddes 1997. There is also evidence that managers are monitored by consumers on the basis of price changes, which is consistent with a political pressure" hypothesis. Overall, this suggests that the GEE estimation technique represents an improvement o ver standard binary dependent v ariable techniques, especially for panel data.
